Second Circuit Rules FLSA Collective Action and State-Law Class Action May Be Brought in the Same Case

Posted on October 19, 2011 by Michael D. Billok

At one point in the Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy series by British author Douglas Adams, Arthur Dent finds himself confronted by a door that will not open unless he can demonstrate a high degree of intelligence. When Dent somehow manages to possess both tea and no tea at the same time, the door opens, noting that Dent must be quite a philosopher to overcome the inherent contradiction of holding and not holding an item at once.

A recent decision by the Second Circuit is reminiscent of Dent’s feat. In Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with the question of whether plaintiffs could simultaneously maintain a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as a class action based on state-law claims under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If you are wondering why that poses an issue, in a collective action potential plaintiff class members are not in unless they affirmatively opt in, whereas the plaintiffs in Rule 23 class actions are in unless they affirmatively opt out. As a result, the same person could be both a plaintiff and not a plaintiff in the same action; out of the collective action because she did not opt in, but in the class action because she did not opt out.
 

Despite the many potential consequences of permitting both participation and non-participation by the same person in a single action, the Second Circuit found that there is no inherent conflict in a federal court allowing both a collective FLSA action and a Rule 23 class action asserting parallel state law claims. The defendant argued that permitting a state law opt-out class action to proceed concurrently with the FLSA opt-in collective action would be inconsistent with the opt-in scheme created by Congress. The Second Circuit rejected that argument and found no inconsistency, concluding that nothing in the language of the FLSA or its legislative history indicated a Congressional intent to preclude concurrent class actions on state law claims, and that other circuits had reached the same conclusion. Another factor may have also influenced the Court’s decision. Earlier in the opinion, the Court stated that the potential FLSA plaintiffs may decide not to take the step of affirmatively opting into the collective action out of fear of retaliation, but that the same risk is not posed by participation in an opt-out class action.
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New York Federal Court Dismisses Donning and Doffing Collective Action

Posted on September 29, 2009 by Joseph Dole

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez , 546 U.S. 21 (2005), “donning and doffing” claims have been filed with increased frequency against employers in many industries. In some instances, these claims take the form of a collective and or class action. Recently, the United States District Court for the Western District of New York granted summary judgment dismissing wage and hour claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New York Labor Law in a case defended by Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC (“BS&K”). Albrecht v. The Wackenhut Corp., slip op. no. 07-CV-6162 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2009). The court’s holdings are discussed below.

 

The action was commenced on behalf of current and former security guards at the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant in Ontario, New York. The plaintiffs sought additional compensation for donning and doffing activities that allegedly occurred before and after their scheduled workdays; specifically, the time spent “arming up and clearing through security and arming down.” In ruling for the employer, the court acknowledged that under the Portal-to-Portal Act (an amendment to the FLSA), employers need not compensate employees for activities that are “preliminary to or postliminary to" their “principal” work activities. In Alvarez, the Supreme Court held that such activities are only compensable if they are “an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities.” In finding that the activities involved in the case before it were not “integral” to the performance of the guards’ principal activities, the Albrecht court analogized the tasks at issue to those found to be non-compensable by the Second Circuit in Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586 (2d Cir. 2007) and Reich v. New York City Transit Auth., 45 F.3d 646 (2d Cir. 1995). The court in Albrecht further ruled that the time spent arming up and arming down involved non-compensable preliminary or postliminary activities because the tasks could be accomplished with minimal effort and were not difficult or time consuming.

In addition, the court supported its ruling on an alternative ground. It held that to the extent the donning and doffing activities might otherwise be compensable, they were nevertheless de minimis in nature. Relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in Singh v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2008), the court noted that the “continuous workday rule,” which generally requires inclusion of all time after the start of an employee’s workday, is not triggered when an employee engages in principal activities that are de minimis. The court observed that while there is no “bright line” test for determining how much time is de minimis, several courts have found time periods of fifteen minutes or less to be de minimis. The court then found that even if all of the pre- and post- shift activities alleged were considered, the time period at issue was de minimis under that standard.

The defendant in Albrecht was represented by Robert A. LaBerge and Christa R. Cook of BS&K. This is the second donning and doffing case in the past year in which BS&K has successfully represented the employer. In Delitta v. City of Mount Vernon, current and former police officers brought a similar suit which was withdrawn after limited discovery. Equally significant, the resolution did not require the City to pay any monies to the plaintiffs. BS&K attorneys Terrence M. O’Neil and John S. Ho represented the City in that case.
 
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